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Executive Summary 
1996 has been the first peaceful year in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the three-and-a-half 
years of  war.  This year has not been an easy one,  but no one expected that it would be.  Major political 
challenges had to be addressed:  the "real" establishment of  the Federation, the elections in Mostar, and 
finally the country-wide elections in  September, just to  name a jew.  And significant further political 
challenges still lie ahead: the creation of  common institutions, the arbitration for the Brcko Area and the 
municipal elections.  There  have  been  ups  and downs  in  the painful process  of reconciliation  and 
reintegration.  But what really matters: there has been no war. 
A year after Dayton,  the first results of  peace and reconstruction, and return to normal life are 
beginning  to  emerge,  especially  in  the  Federation.  Industrial  production  and  employment  have 
increased, so have wages--although all from very low levels.  Some basic services, like water,  electricity 
and heating have been or are being restored in most communities.  Repairs of  housing are underway. 
The Sarajevo airport has been opened to limited commercial traffic,  and major road and railway links 
are under reconstruction.  Schools reopened in  September and health clinics are  being rehabilitated 
Donor support played a major ro~e to make this happen. 
Despite  the  initial  achievements,  reconstruction  needs  remain  vast  and  economic  activity 
remains at low levels.  Industrial production is still only at 10-15% of  its pre-war level,  half  of  the labor 
force is unemployed,  incomes are low,  and the social safety net that exists is almost entirely dependent 
on  donor support.  Refugee  return,  significantly falling short of expectations,  is  hindered by lack of 
housing,  utilities  and job  opportunities,  and the  devastated  infrastructure  still constitutes  a  major 
bottleneck  to  increased  economic  activity.  Although  war  damage  was  less  in  Republika  Srpska, 
sanctions  and  resulting  lack  of donor  assistance  have  meant  costly  delays  in  much-needed 
reconstruction. 
1996 represented a year of transition from  emergency interventions to  reconstruction.  1997 
should mark a shift to sustainable reconstruction and equitable socio-economic recovery country-wide. 
Ensuring sustainability is all the more important, since reconstruction is primarily a Bosnian effort.  The 
$5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction Program, endorsed by the donor community a week after the signing 
of  the Paris Peace Agreements, will cover at most only about a quarter of  the estimated war damages. 
·Large-scale donor support is expected to last for another 2-3 years, and Bosnia and Herzegovina needs 
to prepare now for the time when donor assistance is scaled back. 
Sustainability,  both an objective of  and a pre-requisite for donor support,  is a broad theme.  It 
covers many aspects of  government policies: (i) cost recovery in infrastructure through user charges; (ii) 
sustainable budgets at all levels of  government;(iii) viable and competent public institutions; (iv) reform 
of the  trade regime  to  make  it more open  and compatible  with European  norms;  and (v)  structural 
reforms  in  the  banking and enterprise sectors  to  create  viable financial  intermediaries and unleash 
private initiative.  Sustainable policies are critical to achieving high economic growth and,  eventually, 
creditworthiness. 
In  December  1995,  the  donor  community pledged support to  the  $5.1  billion  medium-term 
Priority Reconstruction Program,  and in  1996,  it delivered on its promise to commit $1.8 billion.  The 
financing  needs  of the  reconstruction  program for  the  next  two-year period of consolidation  are 
estimated at $2.5 billion, of  which the 1997 requirements represent $1.4 billion.  This amount of  external 
funding would keep the medium-term program on track,  and would allow some  "catch-up" of  donor 
support  to  Republika  Srpska  and ensure  a  more  balanced regional  allocation  of resources.  The 
priorities are clear:  continued rehabilitation of  physical and social infrastructure,  support of  refugee 
return and employment generation.  But all these must happen in a sustainable and  participatory way. The challenge is not just to set the target but to present a coherent approach.  A comprehensive 
policy  framework has to be outlined to justify continued donor support and the allocation of  resources to 
specific sectors.  And,  as donor assistance is likely to be scaled back in the years ahead,  clear sectoral 
priorities need to be defined to do more with less. 
Given the world-wide scarcity of  concessional assistance,  mobilizing $1.4 billion for the  1997 
reconstruction  needs  will not be  easy.  Compliance  with  the  peace agreement by the  parties,  good 
progress on the political front and in economic reforms would make a significant difference in donors' 
readiness to commit this amount. 
The challenges of  reconstruction remain formidable.  Cooperation between the Entities and the 
·different  levels  of government;  sustainable  government  policies;  good  governance,  including 
transparency and accountability  in  the  use  of donor funds,  and strengthened local capacity are  all 
essential for achieving results· of  the reconstruction effort.  Similarly,  ad,equate  and timely funding on 
concessional  terms;  donor  programs  that  address  the  priority  needs  and provide for  appropriate 
. regional allocation of  resources,  as  well as strong donor coordination through the Sector Task Forces 
and the Economic Task Force are also key to success. 
The  war ended only a year ago.  Working together,  the government and donors  can maintain 
peace and create a better life for the people of  Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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This  report  consists  of two  main  sections.  The  first  provides  an  overview  of progress  in  the 
reconstruction effort during 1996, and summarizes the lessons of  implementation. The second section focuses on 
1997, and describes the priorities and the overall financing requirement of  the second year of  the reconstruction 
program, as well as the challenges that lie ahead.
1 
Implementation progress  in  this  report  is  measured  primarily  by financial  benchmarks:  (i)  what 
proportion of  pledged donor funding has been committed; and (ii) how much of  committed amounts are under 
implementation. The report uses disbursement of  funds as one of  the benchmarks of  implementation.  According 
to the commonly used definition of disbursement (see below), advances made to the implementing agencies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for future payments to suppliers are also included in the disbursement figures.  In order 
to present an accurate picture of  financial implementation, estimates of  the unused portions of  such advances have 
been prepared, and are shown in footnotes.  (On average, based on a sample of  donors, the unused amount of  such 
advances is on the order of  some $60-70 million.)  Based on more detailed information from donors that should 
be available in the next round of  data collection, these estimates will be further refined in the next status report in 
order to better capture expenditures actually spent in the field. 
It should also be noted that disbursement figures include payments for completed contracts as well as 
advance payments made to suppliers according to the terms of the contracts under implementation.  Finally, 
disbursement data, in line with the used definition, do not include transfer of funds from donors to trust funds 
administered by international financial  institutions or other  international agencies.  While  these  funds  are 
considered disbursed from the donors' point of  view, according to the definition, they would be accounted for at 
the time of actual withdrawal from  the trust funds.  Nevertheless, since these amounts do  represent actual 
budgetary outlays for donors, Annex 1 indicates the amounts transferred to those trust funds. 
Many donors will find physical indicators equally interesting.  This report provides a flavor of  physical 
results achieved so far; however, comprehensive information from donors is not currently available.  A system to 
monitor contracting of  donor reconstruction activities is under preparation, with the support of  the' Office of  the 
High Representative, IF OR and the U.S. government, in order to track and report on physical results.  Information 
on completed contracts and physical benchmarks will thus be enhanced over time, as donor reporting is deepened. 
All information on  implementation progress has been provided by donors.  This information is 
collected and monitored in the Bosnia Reconstruction Program Donor Database, a joint effort of  the European 
Commission and the  World Bank in partnership  with  the  Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
European Commission and  the  World  Bank would  like  to thank the  many  dozens  of donor country  and 
organization representatives who spent time completing database forms, reviewing data sheets and answering 
questions on their pledges, commitments and programs in support of the Reconstruction Program in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  The high response rate indicates the priority the donor community places on reconstruction 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina  Nevertheless,  information gaps exist,  and figures should be considered best 
estimates. 
*  *  * 
The European Commission and the World Bank would also like to express their appreciation for the 
valuable  comments  received  from  the  High  Representative,  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development, the International Management Group (IMG) and other members of  the Economic Task Force in 
Sarajevo during the preparation of  this report.  Nevertheless, the authors are solely responsible for any errors in 
the report. 
This document is supplemented by two other volumes.  Volume 2 of this report, "The Economic Vision and Near-Term 
Tasks  Towards  Sustainable  Recovery  and  Growth",  summarizes  the  macroeconomic  and  structural  agenda  for  1997. 
Volume  3,  "Reconstruction  Sector  Reports",  provides  a  detailed,  sector  by  sector  stocktaking  of achievements  and 
implementation issues, as well as a review of  the financing needs for 1997, and a discussion of  sustainable sector policies. 
iii Definitions and Database Methodology 
Donors use  differing  procedures for activating  pledges so that they  become available  to be  contracted  and  disbursed.  For the 
purpose of  consistency, the following definitions are used in the Database and this report: 
A pledge is an expression of  intent to mobilize funds for which an approximate sum is indicated. 
A firm commitment is a pledge which has been: (i) approved by a national legislative body or multilateral Board; and (ii) allocated 
to a specific sectoral program or project. 
An indicative commitment is a pledge which has either legislative approval but is not yet allocated to a specific sectoral program or 
project;  or,  a  pledge  which  has  been  allocated  in  principle to  a  particular program  or project,  however  is  pending  legislative 
approval. 
Uncommitted funds have neither legislative approval nor project-specific allocation. 
Amounts under implementation are those firmly committed funds for which contracts have been tendered, signed, or are underway 
(including amounts disbursed). 
Disbursed funds are those transferred to an account in the name of  a Bosnian agency, or a disbursement agency (foreign or local) in 
Bosnia, and include expenditures made against works, goods and service contracts, and for balance of payments.  This category 
includes funds  advanced to  Bosnian agencies for the purpose of payment of contractors or suppliers,  but not yet expended (see  . 
below).  On average, such advances have accounted for $60-70 million of funds in the category disbursed.  In-kind assistance is 
considered disbursed once provided. 
Funds expended represent actual expenditures made against works, goods and service contracts, the value of  assistance delivered in 
kind, and fiscal/balance of payments support.  The definition of  funds expended does not include advances made to implementing 
agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for future payments to suppliers. 
•  For each  donor  program,  project  or  commitment,  information  provided  by  donors  has  been  entered  to  the  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina Donor Database  by,  inter alia:  (i)  sector and sub-sector;  (ii)  type (e.g.,  cash  grant or loan);  (iii)  form  (e.g., 
equipment or technical  assistance);  (iv)  channel  (e.g.,  direct  or co-financing);  and  (v)  commitment,  tender  issue,  contract 
signature and end-disbursement dates.  · 
•  Amounts under implementation include the "ongoing" donor activities pledged in December 1995, as well as activities funded 
by "new" donor pledges made in December and April 1996.  · 
•  Where  applicable  to  an  individual  canton  within  the  Federation,  donors'  programs  under  implementation  have  been  so 
classified; if  support benefits more than one canton, these amounts have been classified as "multi-canton." 
•  While most donor support falls  within  one of the  sectors of the  Priority Program or peace  implementation,  certain donor 
programs -- such  as "municipal rehabilitation" -- are  multi-sectoral.  Multi-sectoral  programs have been disaggregated  and 
designated to appropriate sectors according to guidance from donors. 
l  •  While amounts are maintained in the Database in the currency of  origin, figures in this report have been converted to US dollars 
I ,  at the average exchange rate of  October 1996.  The donor information used in this report is as of  October 1996. 
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I.  A Year After Dayton: Pro2ress in 1996 
A.  The First Results
2 
Peace and reconstruction show the  first results 
1.  The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced the first benefits of peace.  In the Bosniac-
majority area, industrial production doubled in a year, although from  a very low base, while average net wages 
roughly  quadrupled,  reaching  about  DM160  per month.
3  Employment  also  increased,  though  slower  than 
industrial  production,  bringing the  unemployment rate  down  from  an  estimated  90%  in  1994/95  to  50-60%, 
which is still extremely high.  In the Croat-majority area, industrial production is estimated to have reached 85% 
of its pre-war level and the average net monthly wage exceeded DM330 by June  1996.  Finally, in Republika 
Srpska, estimates indicate some recovery in both industrial production and wages following the suspension of  the 
embargo in February 1996. 
2.  The first results of reconstruction are also becoming visible, mostly in the Federation.  In August I996, 
the Sarajevo airport opened to limited commercial air traffic, and by now there are regular flights to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,  operated  by  commercial  airlines.  Repairs  have  been  completed  on  two  key  bridges  which 
regularize an important road link between Sarajevo and Mostar, and the reconstruction of  another eleven bridges 
and several road sections is underway.  Urban transport has restarted in the main cities, and Sarajevo tramways 
are  running  regularly  after  almost  four  years  of virtually  no  service.  Rehabilitation  of four  main  power 
transmission  lines  has  been  completed,  and  the  reconstruction  of five  principal  power  generation  plants  is 
underway.  District heat  installations  in  32,000  flats  in  Sarajevo  are  being  renovated  in  preparation  for  the 
coming winter.  Some 5,000 head of  livestock and I,OOO farm tractors have been imported.  Commerce is picking 
up, thanks in part to several donor funded  lines of credit to small businesses.  Finally, repairs of some 15,000 
flats and private homes are underway, many of  which have been completed. 
B.  The Donor Effort 
1.  From Pledges to Commitments 
Nearly 60 multilateral  and  bilateral  donors and  many others have  joined  the reconstruction effort 
3.  Since the first pledging session for the  1996  reconstruction program  in  December I995, a total of 58 
donors-- 47 countries and II organizations-- have pledged their support for Bosnia and Herzegovina's Priority 
Reconstruction Program (Annex I).  Many dozens of  other development and aid agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are also involved in the reconstruction effort and have been key to the success achieved so 
far.  To date,  a total of about $I,894 million has been pledged for the  I996 program, in  a truly broad-based 
international partnership of  nations and multilateral institutions.
4 
Sections A and B of  the paper draw on the document entitled "Implementation of  the Priority Reconstruction Program ifi Bosnia and 
Herzegovina- First Status Report to the Donor Community", issued in September 1996.  The data have been updated as of  October, 
1996. 
Statistical information is only partially available. 
Pledges for the  1996 reconstruction program totaled $1,857 million as  of the  Second Donors' Conference of April  12-13,  1996. 
New 1996 pledges of some $61.5 million have been made since that date (including Albania, Kuwait, Latvia, San Marino, Poland, 
the Federal  Republic of Yugoslavia,  UNDP and  IFAD).  Since April,  the  pledges of EBRD and  the  Council of Europe Social 
Development Fund were reduced by $20 million and $5  million respectively.  With these changes, the revised total  1996 pledged 
amount is $1,894 million. Some 90% of  pledges had  been  firmly committed  by end-October 
4.  Good progress has been made in  committing promised funding.  Almost all pledges, or about $1,851 
million, had been committed by donors to specific sectoral programs by the end of October (Table  I).  Of this 
total,  around  $1,688  million  represents 
firm  commitments  (i.e.,  approved  by 
national  legislative  bodies  or Boards  of 
multilateral  agencies,  and  able  to  be 
implemented); $163 million are indicative 
commitments  (i.e.,  pending  authorization 
or  allocation);  and  some  $118  million 
remains  uncommitted.
5  This  is  a 
significant  improvement  since  August; 
some $160 million was firmly committed 
over  the  last  two  months,  reducing  the 
amount  of uncommitted  or  indicatively 
committed funds to $281 million in total. 
Table 1:  Commitment of 1996 Pledges  1 
%of  Pledged 
US$ Million  Amount 
Total1996 Pledges  1,894  100% 
."i.Toia"i"c.ommiiil1ei1i5···············································~r;as1····························aa%······· 
a.  Firm Commitments  1,688  89% 
b.  Indicative Commitments  163  9% 
2.  Uncommitted  118  6% 
1/  Total commitments  plus uncommitted  adds to more than the 1996 pledged amount, 
since several donors have committed  funds over and above their 1996 pledges,  in order to 
continue ongoing activities.  Since these funds have not yet been pledged,  they have not 
been included  in the total 1996 pledges. 
Donor  commitments  for reconstruction activities exceed  $1. 7 billion 
5.  Of the  $1,851  million  in  total  commitments to  date,  some  $1,719  million  has  been  designated  for 
reconstruction  activities  (Table  2).  Most  of these  activities  fit  within  the  framework  of the  Priority 
Table 2:  Allocation of  Commitments 
%ofTotal 
US$ Million  Commitments 
Total Commitments  1,851  100%  ................................................................................................................................................... 
1.  Reconstruction Activities  1,719  93% 
a. Multilaterally-Administered  1,049  [61%] 
b. Bilaterally-Administered  670  [39%] 
2.  Peace Implementation  132  7% 
Reconstruction Program.  Some $165 million 
of  the total has been committed to balance of 
payments  support.  Multilaterally-
administered  programs  and  projects  (under 
the  aegis  of  international  financial 
institutions and including bilateral financing) 
account for an estimated $1,049 million, or 
61%  of  reconstruction  activities,  while 
bilaterally-administered  programs  and 
projects  (through  national  aid  agencies, 
NGOs or others) represent the remaining $670 million (39%).  An additional $132 million has been earmarked 
for peace implementation activities such as support for elections, media and the local police force. 
2.  From Commitments  to Implementation 
Close to $1.2 billion is under  implementation 
6.  Ten months into the reconstruction 
effort,  the work of rebuilding  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  is  well  underway.  Some 
$1,176  million  civil  works,  services, 
equipment  an4  goods  contract,  as  well  as 
critical  balance  of payments  support,  is 
under  implementation  in  support  of the 
Priority  Reconstruction  Program, 
representing  64%  of total  commitments 
(Table 3).  A further $512 million is firmly 
committed and awaits tender.  Over the past 
two months,  the value of signed contracts 
increased  by  about  $325  million,  an 
indication of  good implementation progress. 
Table 3:  Implementation of Commitments 
%of 
US$ Million  Commitments 
Total Commitments  1,851  100% 
·:,-:···rotii"'un·Cie-i-..  im·ii·iaiTie.iitit"ioi1·······················:r:1·:;·s·······························s4o/~  ........ 
Of which Contracts Signed  1;050  57% 
of which Amounts Disbursed
1  720  39% 
2.  Not Yet Under Implementation  675  36% 
a.  Firm  512  27% 
b.  Indicative  163  9% 
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Includes an estimated total of $60-70 million  advances for future  payments tc 
suppliers.  Future reports  will provide mote details on "funds expended", as don 
reporting  is enhanced. 
Definitions of  terms used in this report and in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Donor Database are provided in the Preface. 
2 0 
Estimates based on past trends indicate that out of the $675  million not yet under implementation, about $250 
million could be tendered and/or contracted by year-end, bringing total under implementation to $1.4 billion, or 
about three-quarters of  total 1996 pledges. 
While overall  financing needs have been largely met, sectoral  financing gaps have remained 
7.  While in  the initial months donor focus was on humanitarian and other "quick-fix" rehabilitation, data 
indicate that during the past several months donors have embarked on reconstruction proper: ··Projects designed 
to  repair transport and electric power networks, rebuild housing, and  support lines of credit and  government 
institutions represent about 77% of  amounts tendered, contracted and disbursed.  A sector-by-sector comparison 
of 1996 sectoral allocations, or requirements, funding  commitm~nts  and amounts under implementation (Chart 1 
and Annex 2) shows that donor funding commitments in several sectors-- 'notably housing, industry/finance and 
government/social support -- have met and  even exceeded estimated  1996 requirements.  While these funding 
"surpluses" have given implementation an important head start in these sectors, they have also meant less donor 
financing  for  other  areas  in  need.  This  in  tum  has  led  to  some  "mismatches"  between  requirements  and 
commitments of  funding which have left financing gaps in some very important programs, such as transport and 
energy.  Volume 3 of this report provides a detailed description of the status of sectoral programs, including a 
review of  sector funding requirements and gaps. 
US$ million 
Chart 1:  1996 Program Allocations/Requirements, Firm Commitments and Commitments Under 
Im plem en [ation by Sector 
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Note: Commitments ·under implementation" include contracts tendered or signed, and disbursements made. 
Donor-funded  activities have  focused  on the Federation 
8.  The primary focus  of reconstruction program  implementation in -Bosnia  and Herzegovina to date has 
been on the Federation, where 84% of the total $1,176 million under implementation-- or some $987 million--
is  underway  (Chart  2  and  Annex 3).  Within  the  clearly  identifiable  cantonal  allocations  of $525  million, 
Bosniac-majority cantons  account  for  69%  ($361  million),  while  Croat-majority cantons  represent  5%  ($27 
million) and mixed cantons 26% ($137 million).  The remaining $462 million includes both amounts specified as 
benefiting more than one canton, and amounts for which donors did not have or provide precise information.  As 
for  Republika  Srpska,  the  effects  of the  international  embargo  earlier this  year  meant  that  preparation  for 
3 reconstruction  investments  got  a  late  start.  Thus,  just  $24  million,  or  2%  of total  activities,  is  under 
implementation in  Republika Srpska.  Finally, some $165  mil~n (14%) ffits'been  oogeted to1he State aflU to 
activities of  an "inter-entity" nature. 
Charf2:' Implementation by.GeQgraphic. Location 
Republi.ka 
Srpska ~ 2% 
Cantons • Identified 
State and 
Inte(~  Entity -
14.% 
1  ~ Una Sana ($36 million) 
2  - Posava ($13  million) 
3  - Tuzla-Podrinja  ($90 million) 
4  ~ Zenica-Doboj .  ($78  million) 
5  - Oornjeddnski ·  ($17 million) 
6  - Central Bosnia ($38 million) 
7  - N:eretva($99  milljon) 
8  - West Herzegovina. ($6, mHlio.n) 
9  - Sarajevo ($140 .million) 
10 -West Bosnia ($8 million) 
C.  Implementation E:xperience 
1.  On the Bosnian side 
1  2  3 
$462 ·million 
(47%) 
9 
10 
Federation -
84% 
Total under implementation- $1,176 million. 
The authorities have been generally effective in implementing.theprogr41'fl 
9  ._  While  a  number  of donors  implement  their  assistance  programs  through: their  own  implementing 
agencies  or NGOs, others rely on the Bosnian  authorit~es to implement the agreed reconstruction act'ivities.  'The 
State  and.· the  ..  Entity  govemrpen~s established. reconstruction  boards  or equivalent  bodies  to  coordinate  the 
implementation of  the ~onor-funded reconstructignprogram.  These bodies have played a useful rqle in defining 
the  priority  areas  of r~~onstruction  anq  taking  decisions  on  -implementation  issues.  Several  ·Project 
Implement(ltion Units (PIUs) have also been set up to manage the day  ..  to~day implementation of reconstruction 
I?Epjects ... \Vhile these PIUs are no~ fully skiH~d in projeqtmanagementand implementation, and need substantial 
ftirther strength,enjng in these areas, they have bee11  instrumental in getting more than 900 contracts signed for 
the  procurement of essential  goods and  services during the  last  I 0  months,  a  significant achievement· under 
difficult circumstances.  · 
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Sp"!e (m!!JeltJentatigr' r{fjcs have (¥!en reduaf#41L  ,,  !(  ,q 
10.  The  background  document  prepared  for  the  donors'  meeting  in  April  19966,  listed  a  number  of 
preconditions for the success of the reconstruction program.  These included,  amo(lgother~, (i) the freedom  of 
movement· of goods;  (ii) transparent procurement procedures1  and. (iii) the creation of some form  of political 
insurance scheme to boost private sector financing for the restart of industrial production .. Early action by IFOR 
and compliance b)lt~e authorities redqced widespread difticultie~ with1the free movement of goods that had been 
experienced until the  early months of this year, although occasional delays  in  the delivery of donor-financed 
imports still occur due to bureaucracy and ambiguity regarding the tax-status of such imports.  As  regards  ~he 
transparency of  procurement procedures, the government has recognized the need for an effective mechanism for 
monitoring  the  procurement 
process, and decided to establish 
a  Procurement  Monitoring  and 
Audit  Unit  (PMAU),  initially 
supported  by  foreign 
consultants.  This  unit  should 
become  a  nucleus  for  a  future 
Government Audit Agency with 
an  enlarged  scope  of 
independence  and  authority. 
The establishment of the PMAU 
is  an  important  step  in 
preventing  possible  abuse  of 
donor funds and providing extra 
. comfort  to  the  authorities  and 
donors  alike.  Finally,  the 
authorities  have  decided  to 
establish  a  political  risk 
.. BoX l: PROCUREM£N'f MON1TORING AND AUDITUNIT 
.  ,- .·  _·  -·._'"._'  .. :\':":'"',  .  '·  '-- .... ,  .:  .,  . 
In  4.>rder to  ep~lu-e the  transparency of  procurement· practices,·. the Bosnian 
il.Uth?rii:ies  have  entru~ed)h~ Institute .  ()fA,cc()unthtg  and _Auditing  (IAA), ·with  the 
assistan,ce qfthe Intemati()naJ Procilrem.ent Alitem;y  ~- v~ (IPA), to monitorand audit all 
proclll'~lllellt  ~ctiviti~s  c~ied , out  .under  World  ..• Bank  (including  .  World·  ..  Bank:- · 
. •  admiQistered trust fUJI~s).fillan9e4,PJ'QJectii  ... •  lAA has access to aU records and. ~ccountii 
()fthe institutions respotlsiblefor the .execution of these projects, and 'its taSks include: .• 
Th~····mo!litoting of  ~t  •.. least one  full  cycle  of  .procurement  and  .· disbllrsement 
transactions  carried  out  6y·~adh'PIU,!for''florld.·Bank .financed projects;  •.. 'This 
m.opitoring  task  •.  •. which  a.pplies<to.·  .•. randoiTily·•  seiected···•·cas~s..  ~nsists/.of•···~n 
•  ·assessment of  methods  ·• and. practicesu~d  .• by tne. PIUs. iQ .  pi'Qciurjhg goods  and • 
s  Bl14 .their consistehcy with •  the  provisions. of  the respective  credit/grant 
insurance  scheme,  to  be  back-stopped  by  donor  funds,  to  help  the  normalization  of  busiiless  relationships 
between Bosnian and  foreign  companies and  banks.  This scheme,  if successful,  could significantly, help the 
restart  of industrial  production,  and  would  constitute  a  first  step  towards  the  reintegration  of Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina's industry with the rest of  Europe. 
But limited  progress has been achieved in politically charged inter-entity matters and in landmine clearing 
11.  While some progress in  building economic institutions between the. Entities 'and within the Federation 
has been made (tax administration, customs and  payments systems, and the Central Bank), there bas been little 
cooperation between and sometimes within the Entities in the major network sectors (electric power,· gas, roads, 
railways and telecommunications).  The difficultie~  •. ofreaching agr~ements by the parties, inchtdingthose within 
the Federation, have  led,  for  example, to a stalemate in  the  reconstruction of the  telecommunication  system. 
Work  is  underway to  resolve  these  difficulties and  to  bring  about rationalization of  the railways  operations~ 
Donors will  J:>e  concerned to see that rational arrangements are put in  place in  the• railways,  power and other 
network sectors that provide for least-cost solutions to investment programs and epsure'bperational efficiency in 
these sectors.  In other sectors (like water supply), therehas also been reluctance to cooperate in  multi-ethnic 
communities, but donors' insistence has helped to bring the parties together in their own interest.  Now, after the 
elections, there may be a better chance for inter-entity as well as  intra-e~tity cooperation ..  Special incentives,. like 
the proposed Quick Impact Regional Fund (see paragraph 25), could also play a useful  role  in helping  fo~ter 
regional  cooperation 'by  supporting. small-scale  but  highly  visible  reconstruction  activities··· in  •• multi-ethnic 
communities.  ·  ·  ·  · 
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"Bosnia  and Herzegovina-The  Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program:  The  Challenges Ahead', Discussion Paper No.  2, 
dated  April  2,  1996,  prepared  by  the  World  Bank,  the  European  Commission and  the  European  Bank for  Reconstruction  and 
Development for the Second Donors' Conference. 
5 12.  Clearing of landmines is  critical for ensuring freedom of movement,  refugee return and for the entire 
reconstruction program.  However, progress in this very complex area has been much slower than expected due 
to  disagreements  between  the  State  and  the  Entities,  and  the  Bosnian  authorities  and  several  donors  on 
management and taxation issues, among others.  A multi-pronged approach is being explored for  1997, including 
contracts with commercial companies, use ofNGOs and a "train and equip" program for local mine-clearers. 
With faster implementation, limited local capacity may become a bottleneck 
13.  As  noted  above,  the  Bosnian authorities  deserve  credit for  the efficiency of  project  implementation. 
However, as the reconstruction program enters its second year, the tasks of  coordination and implementation will 
become even more  ~omplex.  While most of the· Bosnian implementing agencies have competent staff:  their 
number is very limited, and their capacity to handle a large number of projects may be stretched to the  limit. 
Furthermore, there is competition for highly-qualified people among foreign institutions located in Bosnia and a 
growing demand coming from the private sector, resulting in a salary structure that makes it hard to keep staff in 
the public sector.  On the positive side, with demobiliz,ation and return of  refugees, many well-trained people can 
return to  their original  professions,  increasing the pool  of qualified staff for  implementing agencies.  Donor 
support to these agencies, in the form  of technical assistance and the financing of some recurrent expenditures, 
could help strengthen their capacity to manage the coordination and implementation of  reconstruction activities. 
14.  Another aspect of local capacity concerns the ability of local contractors to play a significant role in the 
implementation  of the  reconstruction  program,  and  the  availability of construction  materials.  There  was  a 
consensus among donors from the outset that local contractors should be used as much as possible, with their· 
selection based on competition and the quality and timeliness of their work.  Experience suggests that Bosnian 
contractors in most cases have been able to deliver good quality work in a timely manner and have considerable 
capacity. In addition, to ensure appropriate quality, arrangements for (local or  foreign) construction supervision 
have also been put in place.  As for the availability of construction materials, the market has been working and 
little shortage has actually occurred.· Jt is important, however, that the local construction industry remain fully 
competitive  through  the  strict  appli~ation of  competitive  bidding  procedures  and  keeping  the  procurement 
process open to foreign bidders. 
2.  On the Donors' Side 
Overall, donors have lived up to the expectations by committing more than $1.8 billion in 1996 
15.  As  discussed  earlier,  funding  commitments  by donors  have  reached the original  target set for  1996. 
Table 4:  Concessiooality of Cormitments 
US$MIIion 
%ofTotal 
Comritments 
Total Comritments  1,851  1000k  ..................................................................................................................................... 
1.  Gnmls  1,386  75% 
r:J Wlich In-Kind  73  4% 
2.  Loans  465  25% 
a  Concessional 
b.~onal 
398 
ff1 
21% 
4% 
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Given  the  world-wide  scarcity  of concessional 
assistance,  this  is  a  significant  achievement, 
although the damages in  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are  multiple ·of this  amount.  The  quality  of 
assistance has been high,  with about 96% of the 
funding  provided  on  grant  or very  concessional 
terms (Table 4).  This level of concessionality has 
been  absolutely  essential,  given  the  lack  of 
creditworthiness  of the  country  and  the  need  to 
avoid the build-up of large repayment obligations 
for the future. Donors and the Bosnian authorities alike underestimated the time required to convert pledges to CQmmitments 
and actual disbursements 
16.  Early on, there was a general expectation that as soon as donor pledges were made, implementation of 
reconstruction activities could start.  However,  for most donors  it took several months to finalize the formal  / 
approval  of  their  commitments,  to 
select and prepare projects and do the 
necessary  legal  work  before  ~  ,_ 
implementation  could  begin.  The 
substantial  acceleration  of 
disbursements since the  middle of the 
year clearly reflects this time-lag.  The 
substantial  field  presence  by  many 
donors,  their  experience  in  1996,  as 
well  as  the  work  of the  Sector  Task 
Forces  and  the  preparatory  Donor 
Information  Meeting  should  all  help 
shorten  the  time  needed  to  translate 
donor  pledges  into  actual 
disbursements and expenditures on the 
ground in 1997. 
Better donor coordination could have helped to close large financing gaps in some sectors 
17.  In spite of the several fora and mechanisms for donor coordination--most importantly the Sector Task 
Forces  and  the  Economic  Task Force  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina,  as  well  as  sectoral  donor meetings--it is 
striking that key sectors, such as transport and energy, remained significantly underfunded despite the adequacy 
of the overall resource envelope.  It took more time than expected for several Sector Task Forces to establish 
themselves and to define their proper role in the donor coordination framework.  IMG played a major role in 
helping to get many of  the Sector Task Forces off  the ground.  The Sector Task Forces have recently undergone 
significant refocus and reorganization to move them from  information exchange fora to planning, coordination, 
advisory and project progress monitoring bodies.  The Sector Task Forces have also developed closer working 
relationships with the Office of  the High Representative in order to attain consistency between their deliberations 
and the High Representative's efforts in the civilian aspects of peace implementation.  The membership of  these 
task forces  has  been strengthened during the year,  and they now also  include representatives of the Bosnian 
authorities, which should help ensure that donor activities appropriately reflect the government's priorities.  The 
Sector Task Forces are increasingly becoming a "one stop shop" for donors who would like to avoid duplication 
of efforts  and  ensure  that  their  assistance  fits  into  the  Priority  Reconstruction  Program.  The  reinforced 
coordination structure agreed at the Peace Implementation Council will further support these efforts. 
Information on donor activities focused on financial indicators of  implementation 
18.  Donors  have  regularly  provided  information  to  the  EC  and  the  World  Bank on  the  status  of their 
commitments,  and  this  information  has  been  recorded  in  the  donor  database  operated  jointly  by  the  two 
institutions  and  shared  with the  Bosnian  authorities.  These  donor reports  are  essential  for both monitoring 
implementation progress and for helping donor coordination.  The database, as originally designed, focused on a 
few  key financial  indicators of implementation, keeping in  mind  donors'  willingness and  capacity to provide 
regular updates.  As donors set up field offices and the reconstruction effort has gained momentum, physical 
indicators  of progress  on  individual  projects  (contract  completions  and  other  benchmarks)  have  been  more 
systematically measured  by  donors  and  this  information  has  become  more  readily  available.  A  system  for 
monitoring actual expenditures on the ground ("funds expended") and contract completions and other indicators 
of  physical progress has been initiated; the collection of  data is underway. 
7 II. From Emergency to Sustainability: Challenges for 1997 
D.  Objectives of the Medium-Term Reconstruction Program 
The basic framework for donor support remains valid 
19.  The  priority  reconstruction  and  recovery  program,  prepared  by  the  government  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  with  the  support  of the  World  Bank,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development, was endorsed by the donor community at the First Donors' Conference, held 
in  December 1995  in  Brussels  7.  This $5.1  billion program, to be  implemented over a period of three to four 
years, established a common framework for donor support for the reconstruction of  Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
20.  One year after the start of implementation, this basic framework--though with some changes in emphasis 
described below--remains valid.  Its three key objectives are to: 
•  Provide sufficient financial resources to support a broad-based rehabilitation process that will enable 
rapid  economic  recovery  and  growth.  Support  must  cover  the  full  range  of war-damaged  sectors--
agriculture  and  industry,  as  well  as  the  traditional  infrastructure  sectors  (transport,  telecommunications, 
energy, and water) and the basic social services (housing, education and health).  The reconstruction program 
must focus on  creating employment opportunities across the economy.  Facilitating the voluntary return of 
refugees,  and  reintegrating  demobilized  soldiers  and  the  unemployed  into  the  economy  is  not  only  an 
economic necessity but is essential to the peace process. Clearing of  the estimated 15,000 minefields needs to 
progress quickly to improve safety of the people and facilitate implementation of reconstruction activities. 
Reconstruction needs to proceed hand-in-hand across all sectors; if  any sector lags behind others, bottlenecks 
may develop and slow down the entire process. 
•  Strengthen and rebuild government institutions.  Without effective capacity in government ministries and 
agencies to implement the reconstruction program, international support will not translate quickly into results 
on the ground.  Timely establishment of the new institutions mandated by the Dayton/Paris Accords--and 
donor support for the strengthening of existing institutions at the State, Entity and local levels as well as for 
the creation of the new institutions--will be critical to the success and  sustainability of the reconstruction 
effort. 
•  Support the transition to a market economy.  Bosnia and Herzegovina must make the transition from  a 
socialist to a market-based economy at the same time that it undertakes reconstruction and strives to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.  Establishment of a market economy will be  key to the creation of jobs and to 
sustainable high economic growth on the medium term. 
E.  Priorities and Financing Requirements of the 1997 Program 
Government policies and donor support need to emphasize sustainability 
21.  The 1997 program reflects these three broad objectives.  However, while the first year's program focused 
mostly on emergency assistance--and could be characterized as a transition between humanitarian interventions 
and reconstruction--1997 will be devoted to reconstruction proper, and to the  support of policy measures that 
enhance the sustainability of the reconstruction efforts.  In other words, in  1997, both the government and donors 
should be increasingly conscious of  the need to ensure the long-term viability of  their interventions. 
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IMG provided invaluable assistance in  the formulation of the priority reconstruction and recovery program by  preparing country-
wide and specific damage/need assessments. 
8 Reconstruction needs remain vast 
22.  Despite  the  first  results  that  are  now beginning  to  emerge,  the  reconstruction  needs  remain  vast. 
Industrial production is still only at 10-15% of its pre-war level, unemployment is unbearably high, hundreds of 
thousands people are without permanent housing, and many communities continue to  lack basic social services. 
The  social  safety  net  is  still  largely  based  on  humanitarian  assistance  since  the  government  budget  lacks 
sustainable financing to support the  poorest groups  of the  society.  Finally, the desired return  of refugees  is 
hindered  by  all  of these  circumstances,  and  would  actually  aggravate  the  situation,  unless  reconstruction 
progresses rapidly and momentum is maintained. 
The  1997  program  focuses  on  infrastructure,  refugee  return,  employment  generation  and  overall 
sustainability of  the program 
23.  The key, mutually reinforcing, priorities of  the 1997 program include: 
•  Continued  rehabilitation  of physical  and  social  infrastructure.  The  1997  program  will  continue 
rehabilitation activities in the transport, energy, water, and (if  conditions permit) telecommunications sectors, 
as well as in education and health.  The major focus will be on the rehabilitation of  existing facilities, that are 
essential  for  economic  recovery  and  social  well-being.  Expansion  or  creation of new  facilities  will  be 
exceptional, and will only take place if an  exceptionally high rate of return can be reliably identified or-?fO---
facilitate refugee return.  Government policies and donor assistance programs would need to  ensure gradual 
achievement of cost recovery in the infrastructure sectors as well as provide for mechanisms to finance at 
least recurrent costs in the social sectors.  Appropriate pricing policies (through user charges) in the energy, 
telecommunications and water sectors, as well as increased collection efforts, would go a long way to make 
reconstruction investments in these sectors financially sustainable.  In education and health, recurrent costs 
will  need  to  be  borne  by  the  different  levels  of government,  therefore  it  is  essential  to  factor  these 
expenditures into the appropriate budgets.  If  this does not happen, and since donors are not showing interest 
in financing recurrent costs, rehabilitated schools may be left without teachers and health facilities without 
doctors.  Finally,  clearing  of landmines,  a  pre-requisite  for  many  reconstruction  activities,  will  need  to 
proceed rapidly. 
•  Support of refugee return.  The return of  refugees has significantly fallen short of  expectations. While there 
are obviously many other reasons, lack of serviced housing and job opportunities have contributed to a large 
extent to this  outcome.  Therefore,  the  1997  program  puts  increased  emphasis  on  the  rehabilitation  of 
potential return areas designated by UNHCR.  Integrated assistance programs, covering housing, job creation 
(through  public  works,  lines  of credit  and  other  schemes  to  support  industrial  recovery),  as  well  as 
rehabilitation of basic utilities,  such as  water and  electricity, will  be  designed to facilitate  return.  Since 
progress in all the areas of  the reconstruction program will be essential for facilitating the return of refugees 
and  displaced  persons,  it  is  critical  to ensure  that an  appropriate  balance  is  maintained  in  the  sectoral 
allocation of donor resources.  Unbalanced refugee return programs would not be sustainable or successful; 
renovated houses without water or electricity, or a nearby school or clinic would not create an incentive for 
return.  Therefore,  it  is  critical  to  pursue  an  integrated  approach,  as  part  of the  overall  reconstruction 
program,  covering  all  basic  elements  necessary  for  refugee  return.  While  the  return  of refugees  IS  an 
important social and political objective, any targeted intervention should meet the test of  sustainability. 
•  Employment generation through private and financial sector development.  With  very high  levels of 
unemployment in  the entire country,  rapid  creation of jobs is  absolutely essential.  The  rehabilitation of 
infrastructure  itself generates  significant  employment  opportunities  both  directly  by  the  use  of local 
contractors and indirectly by increasing the purchasing power of those that are employed.  Continuation of 
the public works programs, started in  1996, is also helpful in providing temporary employment and income 
to a large number of  people, but these programs are usually not sustainable in the longer term.  Industrial and 
agricultural production is still at a very low level, and though many industrial facilities will never become 
viable and  should not be reopened, there are several others which have a future.  Therefore, a package of 
assistance to revitalize the economy and create jobs is suggested for 1997 including: political risk insurance 
9 schemes  to  facilitate  the  re-establishment  of normal  trading  relationships  with  other  countries  and  the 
creation of  joint ventures; lines of credit for working capital; small-, medium- and micro-enterprise support 
schemes, including equity funds; and privatization assistance for the large state-owned enterprises.  8 
•  Support of sustainable budgets and structural policies.  The  entire  1997 program  should  support the 
objective of sustainability, as outlined above.  In addition, there will be specific support for the creation and 
strengthening of government institutions and for addressing some of  the major structural issues of transition, 
all  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of recovery.  While  many  of the  structural  reforms  will  take  years  to 
implement, early steps would be essential to sustain high economic growth on the medium term.  The public 
finance reform agenda will focus on the allocation of expenditure and tax responsibilities across the various 
tiers of government, enhanced debt management capacity, and further reforms in customs and tax policies 
and administrations.  In banking, the reforms would encompass actions to restructure and privatize banks, as 
well as support further reforms in legal, regulatory and supervision frameworks.  Privatization of enterprises 
will need to commence and private sector activities will have to be supported by appropriate legislation, such 
as  corporate  law,  bankruptcy  and  competition  laws,  as  well  as  legislation  on  accounting  and  auditing. 
Finally, reform in trade practices and customs administration in both Entities will need to be implemented to 
make trade practices more compatible with the European norms which is Bosnia's long-term vision.  These 
reforms would be supported by different types of donor assistance,  including fiscal/balance  of payments 
support and technical assistance. 
The external  financing requirement ofthe 1997  program amounts to $1.4 billion 
8 
Table 5: External Financing Requirements of the Priority Reconstruction Program (US$ Million) 
Revised 3-4 Year  1996 Firm  1997 Requirements I  Sector 
Program'  Commitments  Sectoral Allocations 
Agriculture  304.0  63.0  90.0 
Education  273.0  82.0  70.0 
Employment Generation  76.0  42.0  30.0 
Energy  871.0  268.0  310.0 
District Heating and Natural Gas  257.0  47.0  110.0 
Electric Power and Coal  614.0  221.0  200.0 
Fiscal and Social Support2  514.0  262.0  120.0 
Health  425.0  83.0  90.0 
Housing  693.0  273.0  15 0.0 
Industry/ Finance  612.0  167.0  180.0 
Landm ine Clearing  203.0  43.0  60.0 
Telecommunications  173.0  27.0  60.0 
Transport  5 83.0  163.0  175.0 
Water and Waste Management  363.0  83.0  100.0 
Subtotal  1556.0 
Support to Peace Implementation  132.0 
Subtotal  1688.0 
1996 Indicative Commitments  163.0 
Total  5090.0  1851.0  1435.0 
3 
1  The 3·4 year program  has been revised based on assessment of needs in each sector and 1996 developments. 
2  Includes support for government institutions, the social fund, other social rehabilitation programs, as well as balance of payments 
assistance.  The counterpart funds of balance of payments support can be used by the government to finance overall fiscal needs, including 
recurrent costs in different sectors and other reconstruction-related expenditures.  The original 1996 program  did not include a separate line 
item  for fiscal/ balance of payments support but the sectoral requirements did include the corresponding recurrent costs. 
3  W bile not specifically earmarked, this total includes provision for the creation of a  "Quick Impact Regional Fund" 
to support regional economic cooperation by the Office of the High Representative. 
In August/September 1996, the World Bank carried out a survey of 175 public and private enterprises in different parts of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  This package of assistance has been designed to respond to the needs of enterprises, as  identified by the survey. 
For more details, see Volume 3. 
10 24.  The overall external financing requirement of the  1997 program and the sectoral allocations have been 
established on the basis of a sector-by-sector assessment of future needs, taking into account both the status of 
reconstruction program implementation during the first year and Bosnia and Herzegovina's absorptive capacity. 
The  aggregate amount of $1.4 billion accounts for some "catch-up" of donor assistance to  Republika Srpska, 
following  the  first  year when  the vast majority of assistance was  targeted  to  the  Federation.  It is  expected, 
therefore, that many of  the 1997 projects and programs will have significant Republika Srpska components.  The 
$1.4 billion represents the external financing requirement for  1997 on a commitment basis, meaning that donors 
would be expected to commit this amount during the course of the year.  If donor pledges indeed  match this 
amount, together with the first year's commitments, by the end of 1997, just under two-thirds of the $5.1  billion 
will have been committed. 
F.  Implementation Challenges 
1.  For the Bosnian authorities 
Cooperation between the Entities and the different levels of  government is essential 
25.  Cooperation of the different ethnic groups is critical to the entire peace process, and a pre-requisite for 
the  success of the  reconstruction  program  and  its  support  by donors.  Now,  after the  elections,  inter-entity 
cooperation  must  enter 
into  a  new  stage,  and 
Entity  governments 
must work together and 
with  the  State 
government to establish 
the common institutions 
and  define  common 
policies  in  the  areas 
envisaged  under  the 
Dayton/Paris  Accord. 
Furthermore,  enhanced 
collaboration  between 
Bosniacs  and  Croats  at 
all  levels  of  the 
Federation is key to the 
smooth  functioning  of 
Federation  institutions 
and  to the efficiency of 
donor support.  Donors 
are  encouraged  to 
provide  assistance  for 
projects that help ethnic 
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cooperation.  It is suggested that a quick impact regional fund be established to promote small-scale projects 
with the specific objective of  regional cooperation (see  Box 3).  Donors are encouraged to  contribute to  this 
fund 
Government policies need to ensure sustainahility of  reconstruction 
26.  The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have to prepare themselves for the time when donor resources 
are scaled back,  by  pursuing polices that make the  results of reconstruction viable in  the  longer term without 
significant  aid  flows.  This  implies  the  consistent  application  of cost  recovery  measures  as  well  as 
macroeconomic and structural policies that lead to sustainable high economic growth.  While achieving full cost 
recovery may take some time in many sectors, clear timetables and action plans should be designed and adhered 
to.  Similarly, it is essential to prepare realistic budgets for all levels of  government, supported by appropriate tax 
11 ,pplicies.,and adrqiyistt;ation.  Dqn,qrs ,will not btt willing to  provide  support  to  .. replace ·local  efforts  in ctax 
collection and cost recovery.  Finally, there is a need to pursue sector policies (e.g.  in  agriculture) that ensure 
longer  term  sustainability,  and  to  proceed  with  the  privatization  and  restructuring  of industry  to  increase 
efficiency,  and  without wasting  scarce  resources  on  non-viable  enterprises.  In  designing their  assistance 
programs, donors should ascertain the longer term viability of  their interventions, and satisfY themselves that the 
government's overall policies and actions in the given sectors indeed lead to sustainable development.  Scarce 
donor fonds should concentrate in those areas where sector policies are adequate,  while in other areas,  donor 
support should be  contingent on the  introduction of appropriate government policies.  Technical  and other 
assistance to the government to develop such sector policies should be an important element of  donor efforts. 
Transparency is key to continued donor support 
27.  Transparency  of regional  allocation  of donor  resources  by  the  government  and  fair  procurement 
processes are essential for maintaining the momentum of donor support.  Geographical allocation of resources 
should be primarily based on need, taking into account the extent of  war damages.  However, it is important that 
all groups of  the society, even if in largely varying degrees, see some of  the benefits of  reconstruction, otherwise 
further tensions are bound to emerge.  Procurement procedures should be fair and clear,  and information on 
procurement activities should be accessible to all concerned.  The establishment of the Procurement Monitoring 
and Audit Unit (PMAU) has been an important first step to safeguard the integrity of the procurement process. 
The role and autonomy of the PMAU should be broadened and its foreign technical assistance strengthened so 
that it could eventually cover all procurement activities that are implemented by government agencies.  Over 
time,  the  PMAU  could  evolve  into  a  government  audit  agency  that  would  review  the  orderly  use  of 
reconstruction support.  Donor assistance to strengthen the PMAU would help this happen.  Donors could also 
avail themselves of the PMAU's resources (including its foreign  audit capacity)  to carry out audits of their 
assistance programs. 
Strengthened local capacity would enhance donor confidence and efficiency of  implementation 
28.  Demonstrated local project implementation capacity would strengthen donor confidence and encourage 
donors  to  have  their  assistance  programs  implemented  through  the  Bosnian  authorities  and  implementing 
agencies.  This, in tum, would enhance the sense of  ownership of  the reconstruction program by the authorities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  There are already some good examples of competent local project management.  As 
their capacities are  strengthened  in  project management and other areas,  the role  of existing PIUs could be 
gradually  broadened  to  cover  all  or at  least  a  large  part of donor  assistance  in  the  given  sector.  Their 
participation in the Sector Task Forces should allow the PIUs to provide feedback on their experience and to play 
a  role  in  the  design of future  donor assistance to the  sector.  The terms of reference of the  PIUs  and  the 
remuneration of their staff  will have to be clearly decided on by the authorities.  These PIUs and Foundations (in 
the case of  some employment creation and demobilization support activities) provide a convenient framework for 
donor assistance.  Finally, since reconstruction activities have barely started in Republika Srpska, a major effort 
is still needed by the authorities to build up implementation capacity.  Donor support,  in the form oftechnica/ 
assistance and the financing of  some recurrent costs,  would be essential for the strengthening of  the PIUs and 
the establishment of  adequate coordination/implementation capacity in Republika Srpska. 
2.  For the donor community 
Adequate and  timely  funding of  the reconstruction program is key to its success 
29.  In December 1995, when the donor community endorsed the Priority Reconstruction Program, donors 
acknowledged that the implementation of  this $5.1  billion program would require their sustai'l1ed support overa 
period of 3-4 years.  The 1997 Program envisages donor support on the order of $1.4 billion.  If donor funding 
were to fall  short of this amount,  it would  seriously risk slowing down implementation of  the reconstruction 
program.  Donors should make every effort to  meet the  1997 financing requirements,  and to  translate their 
pledges into specific commitments as early as possible during the year.  Speciallegislative or other approvpl 
procedures might be  needed to  get commitments  and implementation of donor  assistance  under way on an 
accelerated  basis.  Furthermore,  given  the  lack  of creditworthiness  of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the 
concessionality of  donor assistance should remain as favorable as it was in the first year. 
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30.  Since reconstruction needs exceed by far the available resources, it is critical that scarce donor funds are 
,  sg~nt on the .highest  pr~ority activities.  The Priority Reconstruction Program and its annual requirements were 
prepared with the  objective of guiding both the authorities and  the  donors  in  selecting the priority areas for 
interventions  and  their  sequencing.  The  1997  Program  has  been  discussed  by  the  Sector  Task  Forces 
representing both the donors and the authorities.  It is essential that donors keep to the Priority Reconstruction 
Program  to  ensure  that the people of  Bosnia and Herzegovina  receive  maximum  benefit of their assistance 
programs. 
Sector Task Forces are the key  fora for coordination between donors and with the authorities 
31.  By now, many Sector Task Forces are able to fulfill the role envisaged earlier, namely to be the key fora 
for sectoral donor coordination.  While individual donors will continue to supervise the implementation of their 
assistance  programs,  the  Sector  Task  Forces  will  have  an  important  oversight  function,  monitoring  the 
implementation  of the  overall  sector  ·  .... ... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  . .  ...  .  . .  ..  ... . ... .  .  .  .  .  ..  ..  ....  ....  ... .  ..  . 
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facilitate  their resolution.  The  terms  Sector Task Forces; }Yhic).) consist ofrepresentatiyes ofkey govern  ector. 
of reference  of Sector  Task  Forces 
have  been  revised  to  reflect  their 
increased  role  as  the  reconstruction 
program  enters  into  its  second  year 
(Annex 4).  Government participation 
in  the  Sector Task Forces, which has 
recently  become  a  regular  practice, 
ensures that donor activities respond to 
the  government's  priorities  and 
facilitates  coordination  of 
implementation.  Those  donors  that 
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have not done so are encouraged to  empower their representatives in  the Sector Task Forces.  Furthermore, 
donors are urged to rely heavily on the Sector Task Forces in designing their assistance programs in order to 
avoid possible duplication,  and to ensure appropriate geographical balance and maximum amount of  synergy 
between the different donor programs. 
32.  Coordination of the work of Sector Task Forces is presently carried out by the Economic Task Force, 
whose  membership  consists  of representatives  of the  Office  of the  High  Representative  and  the  largest 
multilateral  and  bilateral  donors.  This  coordination  framework  has  been  recently  reinforced  by the  Peace 
Implementation Council. 
Geographical allocation of  donor support needs to be re-balanced 
33.  The  primary focus  of reconstruction program  implementation  in  Bosnia and Herzegovina to  date  has 
been on the Federation (and mainly on the Bosniac-majority cantons), where some $987 million (84%) of the 
total $1,176 million under implementation is underway.  As of October 1996, only about $24 million (2%)9 was 
under implementation in Republika Srpska.  Most of  this assistance has been of emergency nature, or in support 
of peace  implementation;  full-scale  reconstruction  activities  have  barely _started.  In  1997,  a major effort by 
donors will be required to allow Republika Srpska to  "catch up" with the investment level reached in the rest of 
the  country.  This  support  must  shift from  emergency,  quick  impact  aid to  full-scale  reconstruction  and 
sustainability.  As regards the Federation,  donors will need to fine-tune their assistance to continue to  ensure 
that funds are directed to the geographic locations with greatest needs.  Again, Sector Task Forces should play 
an important role in guiding donors in this respect. 
The remaining 14% of the assistance was targeted to the State or to inter-entity activities. 
13 Information on donor activities needs to better capture physical progress 
34.  In  order  to  monitor  effectively  the  implementation  of the  reconstruction  program,  more  detailed 
information will be requested from donors regarding the actual expenditures spent on the ground and the physical 
implementation of their assistance  programs.  First,  data will  be  requested  on  "funds expended",  within  the 
category of  "funds disbursed" (estimates are that some $60-70 million at any one time is advanced but not spent, 
and these estimates must be refined).  Second, a "contracting module"  has been developed as part of the donor 
database to record information on physical progress.  Members of  the Sector Task Forces are expected to be the 
main providers, as well as the main users, of  this information.  A more accurate picture of physical progress will 
help both the government and the donor community to spot problem areas and quickly devise remedies.  Finally, 
this module will  help  better assess the overall implementation of the reconstruction program.  In  view of  the 
importance  of having information  on  the  assistance programs  that  is  as  accurate  as  possible,  donors  are 
encouraged to cooperate in this important endeavor. 
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Donor 
Albania 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Egypt 
Estonia 
F.R. Yugoslavia 
Finland 
France 
FYR Macedonia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Itaty• 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Netherlands • 
PRIORITY  RECONSTRUCTION  PROGRAM IN BOSNIA AND  HERZEGOVINA 
Pledges,  Commitments,  Amounts Under Implementation and Disbursed by Donor" 
in  US$ million 
October 1996 
Transferred to 
International  Under  Total 
Commitments 
Agency Trust  Implementation  Disbursed'  Total Pledges  Funds. 
0.02  0.02  -- --
1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13 
11.50  22.95  22.58  11.56 
7.57  7.48  -- --
2.00  18.70  18.70  16.70 
0.01  -- -- --
25.44  22.30  6.47  11.72  11.72 
0.50  0.50  -- --
6.00  6.00  5.50  0.04 
5.10  3.76  3.76  3.66 
1.00  1.00  0.60  0.60 
om  -- - --
10.00  10.00  - --
5.00  9.09  3.06  3.06 
9.29  13.19  11.65  10.94 
0.10  0.10  -- --
39.25  38.70  35.67  28.41 
7.00  7.00  7.00  --
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1.60  1.60  0.15  0.15  --
2.10  2.10  -- --
6.00  4.51  0.98  3.33  3.33 
63.65  70.70  40.70  7.51  7.51 
136.70  95.70  39.00  43.60  36.60 
35.00  35.00  -- --
0.09  - -- --
O.o7  0.08  - -
3.23  2.87  0.52  2.63  2.63 
12.00  12.00  12.00  --
100.02  100.00  75.00  69.77  58.11 
ANNEXl 
Funds 
Expended 
(N.A.) 
----------------------------------------------- ------------ ~-------------------------------------
V  Information on commitments  and status of implementation is not available for the following countries:  Bulgaria,  Croatia, Latvia, Portugal and 
Russia . 
.Q/  Several donors have transferred part of their contributions to trust funds administered by international agencies, including international financial 
institutions.  This  column  shows  the  amounts  actually  transferred  by  these  donors.  Donors  who  have  placed  grant  funds  to  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina in a trust fund with the World Bank include:  Canada $3.6 million; Iceland $150,000; Italy $36 million;  Japan $9 million (as part 
of a $50 million contribution Japan transferred to a World Ba!lk-administered trust fund  for post-conflict countries, of which Bosnia is expected 
to  be  one  of the  main  beneficiaries);  Luxembourg  $520,000;  The  Netherlands  $75 ·million;  Norway  $4 million;  Sweden  $1  million;  and 
Switzerland  $5.8 million.  These funds  are considered to  be under implementation  or disbursed  once actual  work  contracts  are  underway  or 
payments made. 
s;,.l  Includes an estimated total of $60-70 million advances for future payments to suppliers. 
fJ!  Donors who contributed to resolution of arrears with mRD are as follows:  Italy $15 million; The Netherlands $6.5 million; Norway $1.5 million; 
and Switzerland $2 million.  These amounts are additional to the total reconstruction pledges shown. 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DONOR DATABASE ANNEX 1 
Transferred to 
Total 
International  Under  Funds 
Commitments 
Agency Trust  Implementation  Disbursed' 
Expended 
Donor  Total Pledges  Funds b  (N.A.) 
NorW,iiY •  40.76  42.40  3.85  37.67  37.67 
Poland  2.90  2.90  -- --
Portugal  1.00  -- -- --
Qatar  5.00  5.00  2.00  2.00 
Republic of Korea  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Romania  0.21  0.21  0.21  --
Russia  50.00  -- -- --
San Marino  0.14  0.23  -- --
Saudi Arabia  50.00  42.00  20.00  5.00 
Slovakia  1.50  1.50  1.50  --
Slovenia  2.89  3.19  3.19  1.53 
Spain  17.50  17.76  2.05  4.65  4.65 
Sweden  30.40  31.30  1.00  19.88  18.67 
Switzerland •  33.50  27.60  7.18  26.15  12.01 
Turkey  26.50  11.50  2.20  --
United Kingdom  39.70  38.93  4.79  38.93  34.21 
United States  281.70  296.96  232.20  123.36 
CE Soc. Dev. Fund'  5.00  5.00  -- --
EBRD'  80.21  87.21  -- --
European Commission  367.10  385.88  212.58  104.00 
IsDB  15.00  19.00  6.00  6.00 
ICRC•  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50 
IFAD  7.30  7.30  7.30  6.82 
OIC  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00 
Soros Foundation  5.00  5.00  -- --
UNDP"'"  2.00  0.64  0.64  0.31 
WHO•  1.18  1.18  1.18  1.18 
World Bank  330.00  325.60  293.00  160.40 
foiAis-----------------1:s94:43-------~:ss[2j  ___  ---181.69 ___  --~:f76:i4  __________  72o~3~------65o~660----
~  As of October 15,  1996 the Council of Europe Social Development Fund reduced its pledge from $10 million (made in December 1995) to 
$5  million. 
f/  As of August 15,  1996, the EBRD reduced its pledge from $100 million (made in April  1996) to about $80 million. 
g/  ICRC, UNDP and WHO implement various programs on behalf of bilateral donors, in addition to carrying out programs funded by pledges made 
at Donors' Conferences in December 1995 and April  1996. 
h/  As  of October 15,  1996, UNDP reduced its pledge from $6 million to $2 million. 
if  Uncommitted pledges totaling $ll8 million are not included.  Total commitments plus uncommitted pledges add to more than the  1996 pledged 
amount,  since several donors  have committed  funds over and above their  1996 pledges in order to continue ongoing activities.  Because these 
funds have not yet been formally pledged, they have not been shown as part of total  1996 pledges. 
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ANNEX2 
Priority Reconstruction Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
October, 1996 
1996 Program Allocations/Requirements, Firm Commitments, Implementation and Disbursements by Sector 
(in US$ millions) 
I  I  I 
1996 Program  I  Firm Commitments1  Implementation as 1 
I 
Allocations/  I  as% of1996  Under  % of1996  Disbursed as % of 
Sector  Requirements  1Firm Commitments  Requirements  Implementation  Requirements  Disbursed 1  1996 Requiremenh 
1.  Reconstruction  1,839  1,396  76%  924  50%  512  28% 
Agriculture  97  63  65%  59  61%  30  31% 
Education  72  82  114%  52  72%  34  47% 
"'  Employment Generation  75  42  56%  21  28%  7  9% 
Energy  403  268  67%  193  48%  81  20% 
Electric Power & Coal  262  221  84%  168  64%  67  26% 
District Heat and Gas  141  47  33%  25  18%  14  10% 
Gov't/Social Support  75  102  136%  81  108%  48  64% 
Health  145  83  57%  35  24%  24  17% 
Housing  165  273  165%  212  128%  144  .87% 
lndustiy/Finance  120  167  139%  89  74%  64  53% 
Landmine Clearing  70  43  61%  23  33%  13  19% 
Telecom  160  27  17%  9  6%  I  8  5% 
Transport  317  163  51%  94  30% 
I 
I  41  13% 
Water and Sanitation  140  83  59%  56  40%  I  18  13% 
2.  Peace Implementation 
I 
- 132  - 117  - I  73  -
3.  Balance of Payments  _  160  _  I  135  _  I  135  _ 
~-------------~--
_________________________________________________  J ___________________ 
frOTAL  1,839  :  1,688  92%  :  1,176  64%  :  720  39% 
11  Includes an estimated total of $60-70 million advances for future payments to suppliers, for a total of $650-660 million expended.  Funds expended as % of 1996 requirements are 36%. 
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Table 1:  Financing Requirements, Implementation and 
Disbursement by Entity 
(in US$ million) 
Revised 3-4 Year  Under  %Under 
Requirements  Implementation  Implementation 
ANNEX  3 
Disbursements 
Federation  568  3,690  987  84 
Republika Srpska  11  1,400  24  2 
State and Inter-Entity  141  n.a.  165  14 
5,090  1,176  100 
Table 2:  Implementation and Disbursement of  Commitments 
in the Federation by Canton u 
(in US$ million) 
Ethnic  Under  %Under 
Canton  Composition Y.  Implementation  Implementation 
1.  Canton-Specific:  525  53 
Una-Sana (Bihac Region) (1)  B  36  4 
Posava  (2)  c  13  1 
Tuzla-Podrinja (3)  B  90  9 
Zenica-Doboj (  4)  B  78  8 
Gomjedrinski (Gorazde) (5)  B  17  2 
Central Bosnia (Travnik-Vitez) (6)  M  38  4 
Neretva  (Mostar-Konjic)  (7)  M  99  10 
West Herzegovina  (Posusje-Grude) (8)  c  6  1 
Sarajevo  (9)  B  140  14 
West Bosnia  (Glamoc-Tomislavgrad) (10)  c  8  1 
2.  Multi-Canton:  462  47 
TOTAL  987  100 
Disbursements 
267 
13 
3 
55 
28 
6 
21 
60 
1 
76 
4 
301 
568 
ll  The "multi-canton" category includes both amounts specified as benefiting more than one canton, and amounts for which donors did not have or 
provide precise information.  Thus, canton-specific results are not complete and should be seen as indicative only.  Over time, more precise 
information will make canton-specific results more reliable. 
y  B = Bosniac majority cantons; C =Croat majority cantons; M = Mixed cantons 
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Terms of  Reference of  Sector Task Forces 
(September 1996) 
A.  Policy Setting 
To establish policy guidelines for program development. 
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1. 
2.  To establish technical, managerial or financial conditions that donors 
require of  recipients so as to promote a sound economic framework and 
effective project implementation. 
3.  To consult with the Economic Task Force of  the Office of  the High 
Representative (OHR) who shall provide guidance and recommendations 
with respect to political conditionality. 
B.  Needs Assessment and Program/Project Development 
1.  To keep abreast of  priority investment needs in each sector. 
2.  To develop, if  they do not exist, or modify, the country wide programs 
within the sector, and to alert donors and recipients to any perceived 
inadequacies in the composition of  existing programs. 
3.  To identify and prioritize specific projects within programs. 
4.  To match projects with donors to optimize execution of  projects. 
C.  Funding Gap Identification 
1.  To advise OHR(Economic Task Force), World Bank and EU of  funding 
gaps between program needs and pledges so that fund solicitation will be 
appropriately directed. 
D.  Monitor Project Implementation 
1.  To ensure to the extent possible that Donor Database being maintained by 
the WB/EC accurately reflects all activity and current status thereof. 
2.  To track the progress of  projects against schedule. 
3.  To track the costs incurred on a project against budget. 
E.  Provide Information and Report on Progress and Problems 
1.  To ensure that the OHR, task force members, non task force member 
donors are kept informed on all matters of  policy, program development, 
and project implementation through regular written and oral reports. Sector 
Water I Waste Management 
Electric Power and Coal 
Natural Gas and District Heating 
Transport 
Agriculture I Food Aid 
Education I Cultural Facilities 
Health I Social Safety Net 
Housing 
Landmine Clearing 
Industry  /Finance 
Employment and Training 
Macro and Structural Issues 
Sector Task Force Leader (Organization) 
Mr. Warner Labi (IMG) 
Mr. Jan Grethorst (IMG) 
Mr. Anthony James (ODA) 
Mr. Dino Bicciato (IMG) 
Mr. Michael Koch (World Bank) 
Mr. Colin Kaiser (UNESCO) 
Mr. J.M. McGinnis (WHO) 
Mr. Kevin Mannion (IMG) 
Mr. Martin Barber (United Nations) 
Mr. Craig Buck (USAID) 
Mr. Gareth Howell (ILO) 
Mr. Saumya Mitra (World Bank) 
Mr. Alessandro Zanello (IMF) 
Phone 
(387 71) 666-020 
(387 71) 666-284 
(387 71) 667-959 
(387 71) 660-020 
(387 71) 440-293 
(387 71) 670-726 
(387 71) 670-838 
(387 71) 666-020 
(387 71) 454-247 
(387 71) 667-900 
(387 71) 665-695 
(387 71) 440-293 
(387 71) 668-167 
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